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of  a Change in the Marginal 
Capital Income Tax Rate: The 
Nakasone-Takeshita Tax Reform 
Tatsuo Hatta and Hideki Nishioka 
The Nakasone-Takeshita tax reform, which took place during 1987-89  in Ja- 
pan, is best known for making a deep wage tax reduction and establishing a 
new value-added tax. Less attention has been paid to the reform’s restructur- 
ing of capital income taxation. 
1.  The corporate income tax rate was reduced. In particular, the top statutory 
rate for the national corporate tax was reduced from 42% to 37.5%.* 
2.  A flat interest tax of 20% was introduced, changing the interest tax in two 
ways: 
a.  The maximum tax rate on interest income was reduced from 35%  to 
20%. 
b.  Before the reform, various exemptions entitled each individual to have 
savings of  Y9  million with their interest free of  tax. The reform elimi- 
nated these exemptions. We  will call the eliminated exemptions “the ma- 
ruyu system” after its principal exemption program, rnar~yu.~ 
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1. See Yukio Noguchi’s and  Masaaki  Homma’s papers  in  this  volume  for details  of  the 
Nakasone-Takeshita tax reform. 
2. The combined national and local effective tax rate as defined by the Ministry of Finance was 
reduced from 52.92% to 49.98%. See Ministry of Finance (1990). 
3.  The maruyu system consists of three programs, maruyu, tokuyu, and yucho. They allowed 
each individual to have  Y 3 million of bank deposits, government bonds,  and postal savings, 
respectively, with their interest free of tax. Exclusion of interest income from the tax base remains 
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Japan does not have a social security number system; hence a person can 
open several bank  accounts, each with different false names, without being 
detected by the tax authority. By doing so a wealthy person was able to get 
around the  maximum  individual exemption level and evade the  interest  tax 
payments completely. Although it is difficult to tell exactly how much evasion 
was taking place, circumstantial evidence indicate that it was pervasive. For 
example, there  were more maruyu  savings accounts than the population  of 
Japan in  1983, and the Tax Administration Agency estimated illegal rnaruyu 
savings to be at least  Y5  trillion (“ ‘Maruyu’ Akuyo 5600 Oku Yen”  1983). 
Thus the primary purpose of abolishing the maruyu system was to make inter- 
est taxation more equitable between honest savers and tax evaders 
The effects on efficiency of  abolishing the maruyu system, however, were 
mixed. For those honest savers who paid the interest tax at rates between 21% 
and 35%, the reform lowered the marginal interest tax rate, reducing tax dis- 
tortion, while for those whose interest tax rates were below 20%, the reform 
raised the interest tax rate, increasing distortion, In all likelihood, abolishing 
the  maruyu  system increased the marginal  interest  tax rate for the  median 
taxpayer,  since 73% of  interest income was exempted from income  In- 
deed some economists, including Noguchi (1987, 99), criticized the abolition 
of the maruyu system for increasing tax distortion. 
The aim of reducing the corporate income tax rate, on the other hand, was 
to reduce tax distortion. The tax cut was intended to stimulate capital forma- 
tion by lowering the effective marginal capital income tax rate.5 The resulting 
revenue reduction was roughly similar to the increased revenue from the abo- 
lition of the maruyu system.6 
after the reform for those with minimal income-earning capabilities, such as the aged, fatherless 
families, and the handicapped. 
The maruyu system was applicable to every taxpayer. In addition, each employee was entitled 
to have additional savings of  Y5  million with tax-free interest. This privilege, called zaikei, was 
retained after the reform. 
4. In 1987, untaxable interest income from nonpostal savings was  Y9.8 trillion, according to 
Ministry of Finance (1991) and that from postal savings was  Y6.7 trillion, according to unpub- 
lished data obtained from the Saving Bureau of Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. These 
figures imply that 73% of the interest income was nontaxable in 1987. 
5. See Nakatani, Inoue, Iwamoto, and Fukushige (1986) and Economic Federation of Japan 
(1984) for the argument for reducing the corporate tax to stimulate capital formation. 
6. We  estimate the hypothetical revenue increase in the interest income tax and revenue de- 
crease in the corporate income tax in  1986, assuming the entire Nakasone-Takeshita reform had 
taken place at the beginning of that year. 
Although the average interest tax rate from 1977 through 1986 was 7.8%, the rate jumped to 
14% in 1989 when the abolition of the maruyu system was fully implemented. If we assume that 
the difference, i.e., 6.2%, is due to the abolition of the maruyu system, we can estimate that the 
abolition would have reduced the government revenue by 0.062 X  24.1 = Y  1.5 trillion in 1986, 
when Y 24.1 trillion was the personal interest income. 
In computing average interest tax rates, we obtain the data on tax revenue and on interest in- 
come from different sources. First, we obtain tax revenue from the Ministry of Finance (1991). 
Second, we obtain personal interest income from Economic Flanning Agency (1990b). This is 161  The Nakasone-Takeshita Tax Reform 
Therefore, the Nakasone-Takeshita package of capital income tax changes 
was a reform to eliminate the maruyu-related tax evasion accompanied by a 
revenue-neutralizing measure that mitigates the possible increase in the effec- 
tive marginal tax rate. Yet  the reform may have increased intertemporal dy- 
namic efficiency cost. 
Intertemporal efficiency cost could be  unequivocally reduced without re- 
ducing the revenue, by making the capital income tax proportional. This could 
be attained, for example, by abolishing the corporate income tax while mak- 
ing the tax rates flat on interests, dividends, and capital gains.’ The Nakasone- 
Takeshita package can be viewed as the first step of  such reforms, since it 
reduced tax rates on corporate capital income and installed a flat tax on inter- 
est income.* It would be of interest to estimate the size of the efficiency gain 
that would have been caused by  an alternative reform of  making the capital 
income tax proportional. 
Moreover, the intertemporal efficiency cost would be eliminated if  the cap- 
ital income tax were abolished, with the revenue loss compensated with an 
increased tax on wage or consumption, even if it would reduce equity. Clearly, 
the Nakasone-Takeshita reform did not change the tax system in this direc- 
ti~n.~  But this would be the policy of choice for those who opposed the aboli- 
tion  of  the  maruyu  system on  efficiency  grounds.  In  order to  determine 
whether or not future reforms should be carried out in the direction of no 
capital income tax, it is essential to estimate the efficiency gain from abolish- 
ing the capital income tax so that it can be compared with the subjective cost 
of lost equity. 
because the Ministry of  Finance  figures before the reform do not contain interest from postal 
savings. 
It should be noted that the interest income figures of the Ministry of Finance cited above contain 
corporate interest receipt as well. The reform must have reduced interest tax payment by corpora- 
tions, since the corporate income tax rate was reduced, while the abolition of the maruyu system 
did not affect corporations. Thus the above estimate of the reduction in the personal income tax 
payment as the result of  the reform, i.e., Y 1.5 trillion, is likely to be an underestimation. 
On the other hand, Ministry of Finance (1988, 1991) and Local Tax Association (1987, 1989) 
estimate that the Nakasone-Takeshita tax reform reduced the revenue from the national corporate 
income tax  by  Y0.45 trillion in  1987 and  Y  1.20 trillion in  1988, while it reduced the local 
corporate income tax by  YO.08 trillion in 1987 and Y0.15 trillion in 1988. We can estimate the 
loss in tax revenue in  1986 under our hypothetical tax reform by scaling down these figures in 
proportion  to the  corporate  income  of  the respective  years.  Since the corporate income was 
Y34.48 trillion in 1986, Y36.28 trillion in 1987, and Y40.64 trillion in  1988, we estimate that 
the revenue loss from the corporate income tax reform would have been Y  1.66 trillion in the 1986 
base. 
See Nishioka (1991) for more detail on the estimation of average tax rates. 
7.  Capital gains can be taxed at realization, as if they have been taxed actuarially. See Vickrey 
(1939), Hatta (1987, 1988), and Auerbach (1991). 
8.  If we take this view, the logical next step has to be the establishment of substantive capital 
gains tax on stocks and bonds, coupled with deeper reductions in corporate income tax rates. 
9.  After all, the flat interest tax  was introduced to roughly offset the revenue loss from the 
reduced corporate tax. On the other hand, the cut in the wage tax rate was so drastic that the 
resulting revenue loss exceeded the revenue gain from the indirect taxes. 162  Tatsuo Hatta and Hideki Nishioka 
The principal aim of the present paper is to estimate the dynamic efficiency 
effect of the Nakasone-Takeshita package of the capital income tax reform. To 
this end, we will estimate the effective marginal tax rates before and after the 
reform. From these estimates, we will derive the lower and upper bounds of 
the dynamic efficiency effect of the reform. 
We  will  also estimate  the dynamic efficiency effects of  two hypothetical 
reforms: (1) making the capital income tax rate proportional to the level of the 
prereform average capital income tax rate, and (2)  abolishing the capital in- 
come tax while raising the wage tax to make the reform revenue-neutral. This 
will enable us to examine alternatives to the  actual Nakasone-Takeshita  re- 
form that are consistent with eliminating the maruyu system. 
We  will assume that the prereform  equilibrium was in a steady state and 
that the reform brings the economy to an adjustment path that takes it to the 
new steady state in the long run. The equivalent variation associated with the 
consumption stream in the prereform steady state and that along the adjust- 
ment path is the dynamic efficiency effect of  the tax reform. 
In his pioneering work, Chamley (198 1) estimates dynamic efficiency ef- 
fects of reductions in the capital income tax rate.  Chamley as well as Judd 
(1987) and Nishioka (1989) is concerned with the efficiency gains of  a mar- 
ginal reduction in the marginal tax rate. Efficiency gains of global reductions 
in the capital income tax rate are studied through simulations. Auerbach, Kot- 
likoff, and Skinner (1983) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) construct over- 
lapping generation models where the bequest motive is assumed away. They 
estimate  welfare effects of  changing  average tax rates.  Jorgenson  and  Yun 
(1986a, 1986b), on the other hand, use a multisector multi-capital-good  dy- 
nasty model to perform a global simulation analysis of various hypothetical 
tax  reforms  that  narrow  capital  income  tax  rates  among  different  capital 
goods. Fullerton, Henderson, and Mackie (1987), Jorgenson and Yun (1990), 
and Goulder and Thalmann (1990) apply such models to the U.S.  Tax Reform 
Act  of  1986. For the Japanese economy,  Hatta and Nishioka  (1989,  1990) 
estimate the dynamic efficiency effects of abolishing the capital income tax, 
using one-sector, one-capital-good dynasty models. 
Unlike the 1986 Reagan tax reform, the Nakasone-Takeshita reform hardly 
changed relative tax rates among different capital goods. Hence little will be 
sacrificed by using a one-capital-good  model in examining its efficiency ef- 
fect. Since the reform kept the average capital income tax rate constant, how- 
ever, the average tax rate models of Hatta and Nishioka (1989, 1990) are in- 
adequate for examining this reform. In the present paper, we will extend the 
model of Hatta and Nishioka (1990) by allowing the discrepancy between the 
marginal and the average capital income tax rates. 
Section 7.1 presents our model and a measure of the efficiency change a tax 
reform causes.  Simulation analyses of tax reforms  are discussed in section 
7.2,  where an adjustment path comparison is presented. Section 7.3 compares 
our results with those of the literature. Concluding remarks are given in sec- 163  The Nakasone-Takeshita Tax Reform 
tion 7.4. The effective marginal capital income tax rate is estimated in appen- 
dix A, and the production function is estimated in appendix B. 
7.1  The Model 
We  present a simple neoclassical dynasty model for which the efficiency 
effect of a change in the marginal tax rate can be examined. For this purpose 
we modify the model of Hatta and Nishioka (1990) by  allowing the capital 
income tax rate structure to be nonproportional.  lo We  deliberately preserve 
the same notation and a similar order of presentation to facilitate the compar- 
ison of the two models. 
7.1.1  Production Sector 
We  assume that the production function obeys Harrod neutral technical 
progress and is linear homogeneous with respect to labor (measured in effi- 
ciency units) and capital. The production function is written as 
Y(t) = WW),  W)), 
where Y(t)  denotes gross output, K(t) the capital stock, and N(t)  labor input 
measured in efficiency units at time 1. Letting small letters denote the variables 
per efficiency  unit of labor, we can rewrite the production function 
Y(t) =  f(k(t)). 
The following relationship holds between the labor inputs measured in effi- 
ciency units and in man-hour units: 
N(t) = L(t)eP‘ , 
where L(t)  is the labor input measured in man-hour units and p,  is the constant 
exogenous rate of technical progress. 
We  assume that the rate of depreciation is constant at 6, so that net output 
is Y(t) -  6K(t).  We define the marginal productivity of capital net of deprecia- 
tion, r(t),  by 
(1) 
and the marginal productivity of labor, w(t),  by 
(2)  w(t) =Ak(t)) -  k(t)f’(W. 
r(t) =f’  (k(t)) -  6, 
These are equal to the before-tax rate of return of investment and the before- 
tax wage rate, respectively. 
10.  Hatta and Nishioka (1990)  assume that the capital income tax is proportional at the prere- 
form situation. This model gives useful information for the purpose of designing a desirable mix 
of tax base but  is unsuitable for examining the efficiency effects of the Nakasone-Takeshita re- 
form, which changed the marginal capital income tax rate but kept the average rate roughly con- 
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7.1.2  Government Sector 
Government expenditure is financed through the capital income tax and the 
wage tax. A proportional  wage tax rate of  8 ,(t)  is imposed, so that the total 
revenue from wage tax in year t is 8 ,(t)w(t)N(t). 
Since the focus of the present paper is to examine reforms of the marginal 
and average capital income tax rates, we assume that, after the reform, the 
marginal tax rate 8;  and the average tax rate 8, are fixed over time, while 
the lump-sum tax rate 8;(t) is variable. Thus total government revenue from 
the capital tax is 83t) + O;r(t)K(t).  The average tax rate on capital income 8  I 
satisfies 
e,r(t)K(t) = e;(t) + 0;r (t)K(t). 
Let G(t)  denote government  expenditures at t. Then a balanced budget in 
each period implies 
(3) 
Hence 
(4)  G(t) = e;r(t)K(t) + W(t)N(t)  for all t, 
where 
G(t) = 8f(t)  + 8;  r(t)K(t) + OW(t)w(t)N(t)  for all t. 
The term W(t)  denotes the lump-sum portion of the taxes per efficiency unit of 
labor in year t. 
We  assume that the government increases the supply of public goods at a 
constant rate n  + p, so that its level per efficiency unit of labor is maintained 
constant at g. Thus we have 
G(t) =  g - N(t). 
This and (4) yield 
(5)  g  = 8;  r(t)k(t) + W(t),  for all t. 
We further assume that the government constantly adjusts the lump-sum tax 
V(t)  so that equality (5) always holds for given g and 0;.  This can be carried 
out by adjusting 8 Jt), 8:(t), or both. 
7.1.3  Household Sector 
We assume that the consumer has an infinite horizon. The consumer’s labor 
supply, L(t),  grows at a given constant rate n.  There is no leisure-labor substi- 
tution. 
We define the instantaneous utility function by 165  The Nakasone-Takeshita Tax Reform 
1 
u  (E(t)) =  ~  15(t)’-”~  if u #  1, 
(6)  1 - lia 
= In  E(t) if u =  1, 
where u  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The intertemporal util- 
ity function is then represented by 
(7) 
where  E(t) is consumption per man-hour  at time t and p is the rate of time 
preference. 
(8) 
This is the rate of return that consumers face at time t. The after-tax net return 
on capital between time 0 and  is defined by 
Define the after-tax net return on capital at time t by 
s(t) = (1 - 8;)r(t). 
Then the household’s intertemporal budget equation is 
where G(t)  is the per-man-hour  wage rate, 6 e(t)  is the per-man-hour  lump- 
sum tax rate, i.e., 
at time t, and i?  is the per-man-hour capital endowment at the initial equilib- 
rium. We assume that the household with perfect foresight maximizes (7) sub- 
ject to (lo),  given a time path of future prices. 
Since technical progress is Harrod neutral, the following relationships hold 
between per-man-hour variables and per-efficiency-unit variables: 
(1  I) 
From (6) and (1  l),  we can rewrite (7) as 
(12) 
where 
t(t)  = c(t)ep‘,  tt(t) = w(t)epr,  k(t) = k(t)epr, @(t) = 0e(t)efir . 
u = i,”.I.. -n-I*)r  u(c(t))dt, 
p*  = p + p/u. 
Similarly, applying (1 l),  we can rewrite the intertemporal budget equation as 166  Tatsuo Hatta and Hideki Nishioka 
where  kO  is  the  per-efficiency-unit  capital  endowment.  The original  con- 
strained utility maximization problem is equivalent to the problem of  maxi- 
mizing (12) subject to (1  3). The household chooses the optimal consumption 
path, c(t),  taking the price profiles s(t)  and w(t) -  ee(r)  as given. 
The first-order conditions for this problem are 
which is the transversality condition. 
7.1.4  Market Equilibrium 
The market equilibrium condition for output is 
C + G + (k  + 6K) = F(K,N), 
where C denotes consumption expenditures. We thus obtain 
(16)  k = flk) -  c -  g -  (n  + p + 6)k. 
We may rewrite this and (14) as 
(17)  k= k(k, c) 
and 
(18)  i. = i.(k, c;  e:), 
respectively. These two equations yield the time path of (k,  c), given the initial 
condition k(0) = P and the value of  the parameter (3:.  Figure 7.1 is the phase 
diagram of the system (17) and (18). Dark arrows depict saddle paths, which 
are the only stable paths of the model. If the initial level of k is at P,  away 
from the steady-state level for the given OF, the economy under perfect fore- 
sight will choose c(0) on the saddle path. From (5) and the path of  k(t) and 
c(t)  thus determined, the time paths of  W(t) and of  0 ,(t) are derived. 
7.1.5  Evaluating the Efficiency Effect of Tax Reform along 
the Adjustment Path 
In the present paper, we consider the long-term efficiency effect of an un- 
expected, permanent change in the marginal capital income tax rate. We  as- 
sume that  the change in the capital  income tax rates  is accompanied by  a 
revenue-offsetting adjustment in the lump-sum tax stream. 
Economic adjustment following such a tax reform is depicted in figure 7.1. 167  The Nakasone-Takeshita Tax  Reform 
ko  k'  k 
Fig. 7.1  Phase diagram 
Let A be the initial steady state, and imagine that the I?  = 0 line is a vertical 
line passing through point A with coordinate (ko,  co)  rather than through point 
E. Now assume that the marginal capital income tax rate 6': is reduced, shift- 
ing the I?  = 0 line to the right so that it passes through point E. Since this does 
not  affect the  k = 0 curve, the new  steady-state  equilibrium  is obtained  at 
point E. 
Immediately after the reform, however, the economy will jump from point 
A to point B, which is on the saddle path leading to the new steady state, by 
lowering the consumption level to c(0).  It will then gradually move along the 
saddle path toward the new steady state E by adjusting the stock variable k. 
We now compare the welfare level along the initial steady state with that 
along the adjustment path after the reform. As the measure of the efficiency 
change caused by the tax reform, we adopt the equivalent variations as a per- 
centage of the initial consumption wealth.'l It is formally defined as 
11.  The present value of  the consumption stream C(t)  discounted by the private rate-of-return 
stream s(t), i.e., 
i=  e-"" C(t)dt, 
is called consumption wealth of C(t)  discounted by the rate-of-return stream s(t) 168  Tatsuo Hatta and Hideki Nishioka 
where  CO(t) and  P(t) are  the  prereform  consumption  and  rate-of-return 
streams, respectively, while P(t)  is the consumption stream that minimizes 
consumption wealth evaluated by s"(t)  among all the consumption streams that 
attain the postreform utility level. The numerator of (19) compares the values 
of  Co(t)  and C'(t)  under the constant price stream corresponding to Co(t),  and 
hence is the equivalent variation of the tax change.]* 
7.2  Numerical Evaluation of the Efficiency Effects of the Tax Reform 
We  now  numerically estimate the efficiency effect of  the changes in the 
capital income tax rate in the Nakasone-Takeshita tax reforms as well as the 
reforms that  the government could have  carried out.  Since the Nakasone- 
Takeshita reform took place between 1987 and 1989, the last year for which 
the reform did not affect the data is 1986. Thus we choose 1986 to be the base 
year of our simulation analysis. We  assume that the economy was in a steady 
state under the prevailing tax mix in 1986, that the entire Nakasone-Takeshita 
reform took place at the end of  1986, and that the tax reform immediately 
brought the economy to the adjustment path. 
7.2.1  Specification of the Model 
be 1986. First, we choose the functional form of the productioi 
We  specify the various parameter values of the model, by  setting time 0 to 
Cobb-Douglas, 
(20)  Y = AK"(LeP')'-", 
and set the parameter values as 
(21) 
based on the estimation procedure described in appendix B. 
A  = 148.16, a = 0.31, p,  = 0.03, and 6 = 0.15 
Second, we set 
p*  = 0.046 (when 8:  = 0.5434), 
= 0.055 (when 0:  = 0.4465). 
function to be 
3, 
These parameter values are derived from the assumption that the economy is 
in a steady-state equilibrium in the base year of  1986. Since 2 = 0 at the initial 
equilibrium, (14), (20), and (21) yield 
12. In the present study, we can directly compute cardinal utility levels of the economy both 
before and after reforms. Thus we could directly examine the rate of change in the utility level 
caused by the relevant reform instead of comparing consumption wealth. Under our specification 
of the utility function, however, doubling the budget under a fixed stream of prices will not nec- 
essarily double the expenditure minimizing utility level. The specification of u in the utility func- 
tion crucially affects the degree of cardinality. Use of equivalent variations may be viewed as a 
way to avoid this arbitrariness. When the sensitivity analysis is carried out with respect to u as in 
Hatta and Nishioka (1990), this becomes particularly important. Note, however, we will specify 
u  to be one in the main part of our paper, and hence the utility function becomes linear homoge- 
neous. For this particular case, the rates of change in the equivalent variations and in utility levels 
are equivalent. 169  The Nakasone-Takeshita  Tax Reform 
p*  = r(k(0))  (1 - 0:) 
= (0.31y(O)/k(O) -  6) (1 - 0:). 
The value of  p*  is obtained by  substituting the 1986 values of y(O)lk(O), 6, 
and 8;.  Estimation of 8:  is explained in section 7.2.2 as well as in appendix 
A. Note that, in view of the definition of p*, the corresponding values of p are 
0.016 and 0.025 when the values of p* are 0.046 and 0.055, respectively. 
Third, we  set the elasticity of  intertemporal substitution equal to u = 1. 
This value is within the range of the estimates (0.3-1 .O) of Ogawa (1986) for 
the Japanese economy. The estimates by  Summers (1987) for the U.S. econ- 
omy are also similar. Moreover, this value was assumed in Jorgenson and Yun 
(1986a, 1986b) and Hatta and Nishioka (1990) in their simulations. A sensi- 
tivity analysis for this parameter for the average tax changes by  Hatta and 
Nishioka (1  990) shows that the welfare effect increases monotonically with 
respect to the value of  u,  but  it is insensitive when  u takes a value higher 
than  1. 
Fourth, other parameter values and the initial conditions y(O)/k(O) are set as 
displayed in table 7.1. The data sources of these parameter values are given in 
the documents published by  the Japanese government cited in the list of ref- 
erences. For the data of capital stock, see appendix B. Our estimation of tax 
rates is discussed in section 7.2.2 
Since the rate of  return on land is considerably different from that on non- 
land physical capital in Japan, and since tax structure on land is different from 
that on nonland physical capital, we exclude land from the definition of capi- 
tal in the above numerical specifications. Also in calculating capital tax rates 
below, we ignore land taxes for the same reason. 
7.2.2  Tax Rates 
Average Ta  Rates 
The average capital income tax rate 0, is obtained by dividing the tax reve- 
nue by its base. The capital income tax is defined as the sum of interest taxes, 
dividend taxes, and corporate income tax. The property tax is excluded, since 
housing and land are excluded from the definition of K in the present model. 
Table 7.1  Parameter Values 
Parameter  Symbol  Value 
Elasticity of  intertemporal substitution 
Rate of population growth 
Wage tax rate 
Average capital income tax rate 
Marginal capital income tax rate 
Government revenuelGNP ratio 
Initial value of  YIK 
U  1 
n  0.005 
6,  0.23 
6,  0.327 
0:  0.4465 
0.5434 
glY  0.20 
y(O)lk(O)  0.81 170  Tatsuo Hatta and Hideki Nishioka 
The base for the capital income tax is the sum of  income from interest and 
dividends, entrepreneurial income (corporate, public), and a part of  noncor- 
porate entrepreneurial income.  Noncorporate entrepreneurial income is  di- 
vided into capital and labor income in proportion to the economy-wide share 
excluding this income. This yields 6  I  = 0.327. 
The wage tax rate is computed on the assumption that all the tax revenue 
other than the capital income tax is the wage income tax. Thus this revenue 
includes excise taxes and others that are not classified as a part of the income 
tax in the tax code. In our model, however, taxes other than the capital income 
tax are nondistortional and hence can be treated in the same category as the 
wage tax. The base for the wage tax is the sum of the compensation for em- 
ployees and three-fourths of noncorporate entrepreneurial income. Since the 
revenue-GNP ratio  (g/y)  is  20.0%  according to  the  Japanese Ministry of 
Finance  (1990,  8),  these  definitions and  the  above  estimates of  6,  yield 
0,  = 0.23. 
Effective Marginal Capital Income Ta\: Rates 
In the Nakasone-Takeshita reform of 1987-89  the effective marginal capital 
income tax rate was changed in three major ways: (1) the corporate income 
tax rate was reduced, (2) the maximum tax rate on interest income was re- 
duced from 35% to 20%, and (3) the minimum tax rate on interest was in- 
creased from 0% to 20% 
In appendix A, we  estimate the effective marginal capital income tax rate 
before and after the reform. This estimation shows that the effective marginal 
capital income tax rate is 46.58% after the reform. For a person who formally 
faced the 35% marginal interest tax rate, the effective marginal capital income 
tax rate was 54.34%, and the reform reduced the rate. For a person who for- 
mally faced zero marginal interest rate because of  the maruyu  system, the 
initial effective marginal capital income tax rate was 44.65%, and the reform 
increased the rate. In view of  the widespread evasion of the interest income 
tax, it is not possible to determine the percentage of the people for each mar- 
ginal rate of interest. Rather than attempt to estimate the “representative”  mar- 
ginal capital income tax rate, we will estimate the efficiency effects of the tax 
reform for the case in which everyone faces the maximum interest tax rate and 
for the case in which everyone faces the minimum rate. The efficiency effects 
of the tax reform are bound by these two extreme cases. 
7.2.3  Dynamic Efficiency Effects 
table 7.2 and illustrated in figure 7.2. 
The Nakasone-Takeshita Reform 
The heavy line in figure 7.2 depicts the value of (19) corresponding to var- 
ious changes in the effective marginal capital income tax rate when the initial 
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Table 7.2  Sensitivity Analysis with Respect to gly: Efficiency Gains from 
Tax Reforms (%) 
Marginal Tax Rates after 
the Reform (6:) 
(dY)  46.58%  32.70%  0% 
Initial Marginal Tax Rate 54.34% 
20.00  0.87  1.69  2.15  0.46 
30.00  1.05  2.05  2.61  0.56 
40.00  1.33  2.61  3.31  0.70 
Initial Marginal Tax Rate 44.65% 
20.00  -0.18  0.77  I .31  0.54 
30.00  -0.22  0.92  1.58  0.65 
40.00  -0.21  1.15  1.97  0.82 
Note: The figures show the percentage increase in consumption wealth caused by the respective 
reforms for the respective initial conditions. 
g  32.7 44.7  46.6  54.3 
CAPITAL INCOME TAX RATE(%) 
Initial Tax Rates: -  54.3%; -  44.7% 
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rate is 54.34%.13 It indicates that tax reform reduced the effective marginal 
rate from 54.34% to 46.58% and improved efficiency by 0.87% of consump- 
tion wealth in the economy. 
The light  line  in  figure  7.2 depicts  the  value  of  (19) corresponding  to 
the various changes in  the effective rate when  the initial rate is 44.65%. It 
indicates  that  a  tax  increase  in  the  effective  marginal  rate  from  44.65% 
to  46.58%  reduces  efficiency  by  0.18%  of  consumption  wealth  in  the 
economy. 
Thus the efficiency effect of the changes in the capital income tax rate in the 
Nakasone-Takeshita  reform  was in the range between -  0.18% and 0.87%. 
To put it differently, the efficiency cost of eliminating widespread tax evasion 
through the illegal use of the maruyu system was at most 0.18% of consump- 
tion wealth.  Since the amount of  interest income for which the tax rate was 
reduced was at least one-third of that for which the tax rate was raised,14  how- 
ever, the elimination is likely to have yielded a small efficiency gain. 
Making the Capital Income Tax Rate Proportional 
The marginal tax rate could be lowered to the level of  the initial average 
capital income tax rate, i.e., 32.7%, by making the tax proportional without 
reducing the revenue from capital taxation as a whole. For example, an aboli- 
tion of  the corporate income tax coupled with an increase in the interest tax 
and the capital gains tax could attain this. 
Figure 7.2 indicates that when the initial rate is 54.34% (44.65%), the effi- 
ciency gain from this reform is 1.69% (0.77%). This is 0.82% (0.95%) more 
than the gain under the Nakasone-Takeshita reform. There is ample room for 
further improving the efficiency of the capital  income tax structure without 
reducing its average tax rate. 
Abolishing the Capital Income Tax 
If the marginal tax rate is reduced to 0% instead of  32.7%, the economy in 
our model could attain the optimum (see Abel and Blanchard  1983). Accord- 
ing to our simulation, the efficiency gain derived from abolishing the capital 
income tax is 2.15% (1.31%) of consumption wealth  when the initial mar- 
ginal rate is 54.34% (44.65%). 
This implies that the additional efficiency gain from abolishing the capital 
income tax in excess of  the gain from making it proportional  is only 0.46% 
13.  See Hatta and Nishioka (1990, nn. 10, 12) for the computational method. 
14.  According to Ministry of Finance (1989), interest income that was taxed 20% or higher 
was Y3.3 trillion, while untaxable interest income was Y 16.5 trillion in 1987. If we assume that 
only 60% of the formally untaxed interest income is now taxed, the amount of interest income for 
which the tax rate was reduced was one-third of that for which the tax rate was raised. 
Note that the above figure of untaxable interest income contains interests on zaikei savings, but 
the balance of zaikei savings is only 7% of maruyu savings, as is reported by the Bank of Japan 
(1987, 160). Thus our assumption that 40% of the formally untaxed interest income is still un- 
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(0.54%), i.e., approximately 0.5% of the consumption wealth. Thus a large 
portion of the efficiency gain obtained from abolishing the capital income tax 
could be attained simply by making the capital income tax proportional with- 
out reducing the revenue from the capital income tax. 
Since the present study assumes a fixed labor supply, our estimate of addi- 
tional  efficiency  gains  ignores  the  efficiency  loss  due  to  the  revenue- 
compensating increase in the wage rate. Hence even 0.5% is an overestima- 
tion of the efficiency gain obtainable from eliminating capital income tax as a 
tax base. This implies that eliminating capital income as a tax base hardly 
gives additional efficiency gains. 
7.2.4  Sensitivity Analysis 
The sensitivity analysis with respect to (T for reductions of average tax rates 
in  Hatta and Nishioka (1990) showed that assuming a value higher than  1 
hardly changes the efficiency effect but that assuming a lower value makes the 
effect smaller. This implies that our estimates above are the upper bounds of 
these effects. 
Iwata, Suzuki, and Yoshida  (1987) estimated the rates of  depreciation of 
various types of capital for Japan in 1983. Our estimate of the rate of deprecia- 
tion, which is 15.13%, is obtained as an aggregate of these rates weighted by 
the capital stock of  each type.  This estimate of  depreciation rate is much 
higher than that of the United States, presumably because of a higher Japanese 
growth rate. A lower depreciation rate would reduce effective marginal capital 
income tax rates, as can be seen from the comparison between the estimate of 
Kikutani and Tachibanaki and those of others in table 7A.2. Thus lower depre- 
ciation rates would further reduce our estimate of the efficiency effect of the 
Nakasone-Takeshita reform, reinforcing our qualitative conclusion. 
The sensitivity analysis with respect to the share of government spending is 
presented in tables 7.2 for the two initial marginal tax rates; the range of  the 
efficiency effect of  the Nakasone-Takeshita reform would be  -0.22%  and 
1.05% if  g/y were 30%, while it would be  -0.27%  and 1.33% if gly were 
40%. Thus the change in g/y has rather mild impacts on the efficiency effect 
of a given tax reform. 
The tables also indicate that the additional efficiency gain brought about by 
abolishing the capital income tax in excess of making it simply proportional 
is approximately 0.6% of consumption wealth when g/y is 30% or less. 
7.3  Notes on the Literature 
Different measures of efficiency gains have been employed in the literature. 
In equation (19) we are concerned with the “rate of increase in consumption 
wealth” as defined in that equation. Goulder and Thalmann (1990), however, 
examine “the rate of  increase in full wealth,” where full wealth is the sum of 
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(1990), on the other hand, use a measure whose numerator is the same as that 
of  Goulder  and  Thalmann  and  whose  denominator  is  “private  national 
wealth,”  which  is full wealth  minus human  wealth  (i.e., the  present  value 
of leisure and the wage income streams). Thus their percentage figures over- 
estimate the rate of increase either in full wealth  or in private wealth.  (See 
their footnote 27.) Although the ratio of private national wealth to full wealth 
is not available in Jorgenson and Yun  (1986a,  1986b,  1990), it is 5.6% in 
Goulder and Thalmann (1990)J We will thus transform Jorgenson and Yun’s 
percentage figures into the rate of  increase in full wealth by multiplying  by 
0.056. 
We are now in a position  to compare our simulation results with those of 
the literature. 
First,  Fullerton,  Henderson,  and  Mackie  (1987),  Jorgenson  and  Yun 
(1990),  and Goulder and Thalmann  (1990) estimate the dynamic efficiency 
effects of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of  1986. While the Nakasone-Takeshita 
reform simply reduced the statutory rate of corporate tax across the board, the 
U.S. reform reduced intratemporal tax wedges among different capital goods. 
Thus these articles use large-scale simulation models that allow different mar- 
ginal  tax  rates on heterogeneous  capital goods.  Fullerton,  Henderson,  and 
Mackie (1987) and Jorgenson and Yun  (1990) show that the efficiency im- 
provement caused by the reduced intratemporal tax wedges outweigh the effi- 
ciency loss caused by the increased intertemporal tax wedge, while Goulder 
and Thalmann (1990) show the opposite. The former models may yield higher 
efficiency gains from reductions of intratemporal distortions than  the latter, 
because the former assume an instantaneous shift of  capital assets between 
different types and sectors, while the latter does not. 
Second, Jorgenson and Yun (1990) show that elimination of  all intratem- 
poral wedges increases full wealth by 16.7% of private national wealth, or by 
0.96% of full wealth.  Goulder and Thalmann (1990, 29) show that a hypo- 
thetical, revenue-neutral reform that “combines housing integration with a 30 
percent reduction (on average) of marginal effective tax rates” increases full 
wealth by 0.5%. 
These estimates of  the gains are smaller than our estimate of the gains from 
making the capital income tax rate proportional for Japan, which is between 
0.77% and 1.69%. This may be caused by the fact that the prereform effective 
marginal tax rate is higher in Japan than in the United States. 
Third, Jorgenson  and Yun  (1986a,  1986b) study  the  dynamic efficiency 
effect of  making  all the  marginal tax  rates of  heterogeneous capital goods 
zero. They show that expensing investment expenditure increases full wealth 
by 26-27%  of private national wealth, or 1.5% of full wealth, if the resulting 
15.  According to Goulder and Thalmann (1990, 45), the private national wealth (financial 
wealth in their terminology) is 201355 = 0.056 of full wealth (present value of full consumption). 
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revenue loss is financed by  an increase in the wage tax. Jorgenson and Yun 
(1990) also estimate an almost identical percentage increase in efficiency gain 
from a reform that removes “intertemporal tax wedges on all assets.”  l6 
These efficiency gains are in the same order of magnitude as our estimate 
of the gain from abolishing the capital income tax, which is between 1.31% 
and 2.15% of  consumption wealth. The closeness is purely accidental, how- 
ever. The prereform Japanese effective marginal tax rate is higher than that of 
the United States, but intrasectoral distortions, especially between business 
capital and housing, are greater in  the United States.” It appears that these 
two factors offset each other to yield similar total efficiency effects. 
Fourth, several authors study the dynamic efficiency effect of abolishing the 
capital income tax in a single-capital-good model where the capital income 
tax is assumed to be already proportional in the prereform equilibrium. Em- 
ploying  an  overlapping  generation  model  with  endogenous labor  supply, 
Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner (1983) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) 
estimate a negative efficiency gain associated with the abolition of the capital 
income tax accompanied by a revenue-offsetting increase in the wage tax rate. 
This implies that the efficiency gain obtained from reducing intertemporal dis- 
tortions is smaller than the efficiency loss from increasing the distortion in the 
labor-consumption choice. Employing a dynasty model with an endogenous 
labor supply for the Japanese economy, Hatta and Nishioka (1989) estimate 
that the dynamic efficiency gain from abolishing the capital income tax would 
be 0.08% of the consumption wealth. 
Employing a similar model with  fixed labor supply, Hatta and Nishioka 
(1990) estimate that this gain is around 0.43% of  consumption wealth. This 
number is remarkably similar to our estimate in the present paper that the 
difference between the efficiency gain from abolishing the capital income tax 
in excess of the gain from making the tax proportional is just about 0.5% of 
consumption wealth. This suggests that average tax rate models, as simple as 
they are, are sufficiently powerful for the purpose of  analyzing the relative 
efficiency  of different tax bases. 
7.4  Concluding Remarks 
We  have evaluated the efficiency effects of changing the effective marginal 
capital income tax rate by  simulating the Nakasone-Takeshita reform and a 
few alternative reforms. 
16. Their estimate of the  efficiency gain is $3,853.9 billion, while the nominal value of  the 
U.S. private national wealth at the beginning of  1987 was $15,920.2 billion (Jorgenson and Yun 
1990, S189, S182). The rate of  increase in the full wealth is obtained from footnote 17. 
17.  In  particular, the large discrepancies between the marginal tax rate between housing and 
other capital goods in the  United States, which do not exist in Japan,  appear a major cause of 
inefficiencies  in the  U.S. tax  system. See Jorgenson and Yun  (1990), Goulder and Thalmann 
(1990). and Skinner (1990) on the importance of the  wedge between the housing sector and the 
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The revenue-neutral  changes in the capital income tax rates in the Naka- 
sone-Takeshita reform eliminated a source of major tax evasion-the  maruyu 
system. Our estimates show that this reform was accompanied by an efficiency 
gain of between -  0.18% and 0.87% of  consumption wealth.  We  may con- 
clude,  therefore,  that  the  Nakasone-Takeshita  reform  eliminated  a  major 
source of tax evasion with relatively little efficiency cost, if any. 
Our  simulation  also indicates  that  the  marginal  capital  income tax  rate 
could have been reduced to the level of the average tax rate to yield an effi- 
ciency  gain  of  between  0.77% and  1.69%  of  consumption  wealth,  while 
maintaining a constant level of revenue from the capital income tax. The ad- 
ditional efficiency gain that could be brought about from abolishing the capital 
income tax is 0.5% of consumption wealth, and even this is likely to be an 
overestimation of the gain. This implies that eliminating capital income as a 
tax base yields relatively small additional efficiency gains. 
Appendix A 
Estimation o  Efective Marginal Capital 
Income Tax ff  ates 
In this appendix, we estimate the aggregate effective marginal capital income 
tax rates for the 1986 Japanese economy. In this estimation, the marginal in- 
terest rate that firms face are not given exogenously, but will be derived from 
the data on production function and tax rates. 
Marginal Capital Income Tax Rate and Interest Rate 
expressed as 
From equation (8), the effective marginal  capital income tax  rate can be 
where r is the before-tax real rate of return on marginal investment and s  is the 
after-tax real rate of return that savers face.l8 At the initial equilibrium, the 
value of r is derived from the production function. Once s is determined, then 
0;  at the initial equilibrium can be estimated. 
The relationship  between  s and  the  marginal  nominal  interest  rate  i is 
given by 
(A3  s = (1 -  0,)i - n, 
18. The basic reference for the concept of the effective marginal capital income fax is King and 
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where Oi  is the marginal personal tax rate on interest income and IT  the rate of 
inflation. Statistical data are amply available for average interest rates but not 
for marginal rates; hence we have to estimate the value of i. 
The profit maximization  condition requires the real rate of return,  r, to be 
equal to the capital cost: 
r=  - 6,  1-8,  (A3) 
where L is the nominal discount rate that investing firms face, 8,  is the mar- 
ginal corporate tax rate, and A(L) is the present value of grants and tax allow- 
ances per unit of investment  (the functional  form of which is to be defined 
later). 
The nominal discount rate is different for each source of finance.  In 1983 
(Iwata, Suzuki,  and Yoshida  1987),  49% of  corporate  investment  was  fi- 
nanced by retained earnings, 48% by debt, and 3% by  newly issued shares. 
Thus we approximate the nominal discount rate by 
(1 -A(L))(L  + 8 -  IT) 
L  = 0.49  L,  + 0.48 L~  + 0.03 L,, 
where  L,  is the nominal discount rate for retained earnings, L~  is that for debt 
financing, and  L,  is that for new  share issues. In turn,  L~,  L~,  and  L,  may be 
defined as 
L~  = i (1 -  Oc), 
and 
i(l - Oi) 
L"  = 
A  (1 - e,)' 
where  A  is the opportunity cost of  retained earnings in terms of  gross divi- 
dends foregone, while  O,, O,,  O,, and 8,  are the tax rates on interests,  divi- 
dends, corporate income, and accrued capital gains, respectively. Combining 
the above three equations, we obtain the following: 
We are now in a position to estimate i at the initial equilibrium.  Since r is 
known, we can solve for L  from (A3) once the functional form of A(L) and 
other parameters are given. By substituting this solution for L in (A4), we can 
solve for i from (A4). In view of (Al)  and (A2), we thus find the value of the 
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A tax reform will not change r immediately because K  and L do not shift 
instantaneously.  By changing the tax parameters but not r in equation (A3), 
we get a new  L. This and (A4) together yield the new interest rate after the tax 
reform. The new marginal  capital  income tax  rate is similarly obtained  as 
above. 
Definition of the Function A(  L) 
Let us now define the function A(L) for Japan by simplifying the formulation 
of Kikutani and Tachibanaki (1987). Let o,,  o,,  and w3  be the shares of the 
cost of assets that are depreciated by declining balance, by straight line, and 
by the first year write-off,  respectively.  Let €),A,,  erA2,  and €),A, be the pre- 
sent values of tax saving from the respective depreciation methods. Then the 
present value of all tax allowances, denoted by A,  satisfies 
A = 9c{o,A, + w2A, + w,(A,  + 5>), 
where 6 is the proportion of special depreciation. In turn, A ,,  A,, and A, may 
be defined as follows: 
(1 -  v)  (1 - cL3 
LT 
(1 -  v)  (1 - e-lP) 
LF 
A, =  9 
A, =  I 
where a is the rate of tax depreciation on an exponential basis, v the rate of 
residual value of the asset, T the tax lifetime, and T* a depreciable period after 
the first-year  special write-off(T*  = T(l - 6 - v)/(l -  v)).  From the last 
four equations A  can be expressed  as a function  of  L,  and this  defines the 
function A(L). 
Parameters o,,  5,  a, v,  T, and A  are aggregated from the data provided in 
Iwata, Suzuki, and Yoshida (1987) by taking a weighted average of the capital 
stock share. Parameters o,  and o,  are obtained by combining the data pro- 
vided by Iwata et d. and by Kikutani and Tachibanaki (1987). These parame- 
ter values are presented in table 7A. 1. 
Estimates 
Our estimates of  the marginal  capital income tax rates for 1986 are pre- 
sented in table 7A.2 along with the estimates of Iwata, Suzuki, and Yoshida 
(1987) for 1983 and Kikutani and Tachibanaki (1987) for 1980. Our estimate 
is very close to that of Iwata et al. As Iwamoto (1989) reveals, different spec- 
ifications of 6 and 7~ explain most of the difference between the estimates of 
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key parameters in Iwata et al. and ours, therefore, explains the similarity of 
the estimates of the marginal tax rates between these two articles.19 
Table 7A.l  Parameter Values for Computing Marginal Tax Rates 
Parameter  Value  Parameter  Value 
@d  0.20  5  0.3499 
0:  0.00  a  0.1564 
7r  0.014  T  19.28 
*I  0.72  V  0.1 
02  0.18  k  1.1 
"3  0.099 
~ 
Table 7A.2  Estimates of the Effective Marginal Capital Income Tax Rates (%) 
Present Paper 
Iwata, Suzuki,  Kikutani, 
1986  Yoshida  Tachibanaki 
1986  1986  (after reform)  1983  1980 
0,  0  35  20  20.02  18.85 
7F  1.4  1.4  1.4  0.6  8.25 
6  15.13  15.13  15.13  15.13  5.38 
0,  52.92  52.92  49.98  56.83  52.61 
9,.  44.65  54.34  46.58  47.19  9.6 
Appendix B 
Estimation of the Production Function 
Parameter values (2  1) are based on the following maximum likelihood esti- 
mation of  (20) obtained under the assumption that the error term obeys the 
first order autoregressive model: 
In (YIL) =  4.9983 +  0.31353 In (KIL) +  0.019669 f, 
(6.4504)  (2.7653)  (2.2414) 
R2 = 0.998262,R2 = 0.998058, 
F = 4450.25, SER = 0.0230643, DW = 1.4580. 
From this we obtain a = 0.31, A = 148.16, and p = 0.03. 
19. The cited estimate of  Iwata, Suzuki, and Yoshida in table 7A.2 is based on their assumption 
that the capital cost is 10%. By accident, this is close to our value, 9.98%, which is derived from 
our estimated parameter values of  the production function. This gives an additional reason for the 
similarity of the estimates 0;of  the two articles. Note that Iwamoto (1991)  shows that the marginal 
capital income tax rate is lower than the estimate of Iwata, Suzuki, and Yoshida (1987) when land 
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In the above estimate, fiscal year data from 1968 to 1987 are used. The data 
sources are as follows: Y is from Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report 
on National Accounts, L is obtained by multiplying the employed labor force 
from Monthly Report  on  the Labor Force  Survey  and  hours  of  labor from 
Monthly Labor Survey (both Ministry of Labor), and K  is obtained by multi- 
plying the capital stock data from Economic Planning Agency, Capital Stock 
of  Private Enterprises, and the utilization ratio obtained from Ministry of In- 
ternational Trade and Industry, Industrial Statistics Monthly. 
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Comment  Medhi Krongkaew 
I have to start by  saying that I am not a practitioner of neoclassical economic 
modeling. I rarely need to depend on it in my work in Thailand. This is not to 
say that it is not useful or relevant. It’s just that we  can find a better way  to 
explain to the public at large or convince policymakers than using neoclassical 
modeling. 
But perhaps this neoclassic paper by  Tatsuo Hatta and Hideki Nishioka is 
different. It addresses a very pertinent issue, how much the economy gained 
from the reduction of distortions associated with capital income taxation. 
This paper is concise yet comprehensive. It explains the steps involved and 
procedures used clearly and carefully. It is a very neat paper, and the authors 
should be congratulated for this. 
I have several comments that might help to improve the paper. I will sepa- 
rate my comments into two parts: those on the technical aspects of the paper 
and those on the political economic aspects of the paper. 
I don’t find anything unusual about the model itself, but I know  that for 
practitioners of neoclassical modeling the realism of assumptions is unimpor- 
tant  as long  as the model’s predictive power  is  assured. A  general reader 
would find that the assumptions here are unacceptable: the consumer is an 
infinitely  long-lived  representative  agent;  the  consumer  has  no  leisure- 
commodity substitution; the household has perfect foresight; and the time path 
for future prices is freely visible. Of  course some could try to relax some of 
the restrictive assumptions to make them more realistic, or put in more scen- 
arios that might effect the outcomes of the study-and  this is what Hatta and 
Nishioka might attempt to do. But since some parameter values are not actual 
but estimated, the more adjustments you make, the more estimations for pa- 
rameter values you have to make. That may lead you farther from the true 
picture of the situation rather than nearer to it. I don’t know whether we could 
call this the second-best theorem applied to model estimations. 
The second comment has to do with the estimation techniques used in the 
study. In the neoclassical model where the economy is divided into two sec- 
tors, labor and capital, the measurement problems can become acute without 
a good statistical data base. Measuring labor is easy enough, but measuring 
capital may be a little tricky. I am not quite sure how  reliable the statistics 
used by Hatta and Nishioka to measure capital inputs are. There seem to be 
several roundabout ways to get to the size of K.  You  used the sampled survey 
data from Capital Stock of Private Enterprises and the National Wealth Survey 
ofJapan and multiply that by  survey data on utilization ratio from Zndustrial 
Statistics Monthly. How reliable are these data and your method? If my under- 
standing of your technique is correct, you have to work backward through the 
estimated depreciation rate. 
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Third, the use of  1985 as the base year begs the question whether it is a 
typical or representative year that will not unnecessarily distort the final find- 
ings of the study. I don’t know what happened in Japan during that year, but 
for countries in Southeast Asia,  1985 was an unusually  bad year. Recession 
had hit many countries in the area. We have high growth economies such as 
Singapore and Malaysia experiencing negative growth rates for the first time 
in their modem history. In Thailand we still had positive growth rate but very 
small. In an unusual situation such as this, I don’t know whether using  1985 
as a base year  in this  study would  affect the result so much that the use of 
another year’s data is called for. 
Fourth, most estimated values of parameters look reasonable. The rate of 
population growth in Japan is OK; the wage tax rate of 12% is OK; the import 
and capital income tax of 25% is OK; but the ratio of government revenue 
(from both  wage  and capital  income) to GNP of  11.7% is too small. This 
should be explained. 
Finally,  the  difference  in  the magnitude of  the efficiency gains from the 
reduction  in capital income tax between this study and the studies by other 
researchers, especially that of Jorgenson and Yun, requires further investiga- 
tion. I tend to agree with the findings by Hatta and Nishioka that the efficiency 
gain from capital income tax abolishment is only 0.5% of the net present of 
future private consumption. But since this contrasts fantastically with the find- 
ing by Jorgenson and Yun that a similar tax change would lead to an increase 
of 25% of the national private wealth, there must be something wrong some- 
where, if not in the modeling, then in the statistical data. This point should be 
considered more carefully. 
This leads me to a comment on the political economics aspects of capital 
income tax change.  Hatta and Nishioka confirms my existing belief that tax 
on capital income does not much affect the investment capital accumulation, 
because the capital owners can always find ways to shift the burden  some- 
where else. Therefore his finding that the efficiency gain from capital income 
abolition is only 0.5% of future consumption may lend  support to a policy 
position  against giving additional incentives to capital owners at the expense 
of  wage earners. Perhaps the finding of John Whalley  that taxes have little 
contribution to growth could also be used to support said position, although 
in a reverse fashion: if tax doesn’t help, it doesn’t hurt either. 
The suggestion that the capital income tax be abolished and the revenues 
foregone recouped through increase in wage tax may be casually made in this 
paper or similar papers. But we all know that in actual practice this is a very 
difficult undertaking indeed.  On many occasions we may find that a partial 
reform or revision of existing tax may not lead to the desired result, but that 
only partial reform is politically feasible. The question is whether you should 
wait until the situation and timing are right for a total reform or be content 
with piecemeal changes that are slow and ineffective. This kind of problem is 
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The political economic issues governing capital income and wage income 
may be  more sensitive than  what  the paper such as Hatta’s and Nishioka’s 
would indicate. In a country where the growth is good but the distribution is 
quite unequal,  such as Thailand, the capital sector obviously benefits more 
from growth than does the wage sector. And wealth begets political power to 
protect and increase wealth. Any drastic, or I could even say blatant, effort to 
cut capital income tax and substitute the revenue loss by wage tax for the sake 
of  efficiency would  certainly  lead  to protest  and political  upheaval.  So  one 
needs to be very careful in coming to a conclusion that may lead to unintended 
revolution. 
Despite these comments  I still think that Hatta and Nishioka  have done a 
very good job. They will have to continue to fight with other scholars such as 
Yuan, who has done similar studies with quite different results. 
Comment  Assaf Razin 
The paper by Tatsuo Hatta and  Hideki  Nishioka provides  estimates for the 
macroeconomic effects of a permanent change in the tax rate on capital in- 
come within the framework of a neoclassical growth model. The authors cali- 
brate the basic parameters of the model and initial values to fit Japan’s eco- 
nomic  structure,  based on 1985 figures.  In their model the optimal capital 
income tax is zero, as in Chamley.’ They estimate that the efficiency gain of a 
decline in the capital income tax from 50 percent to 25 percent, while adjust- 
ing the wage tax rate so as to maintain  a balanced  government budget, is at 
most less than one-half of a percent of consumption. This low estimate is in 
the spirit of the low estimate for the gains from consumption smoothing in 
Lucas . 
Two  potentially  important  mechanisms,  which  could  augment the  gains 
from such a reform, are missing,  however.  First, the model abstracts from 
investment in human capiral. Evidently, a tax on capital income discriminates 
against capital accumulation in human as well as physical form, because of 
the double taxation  of saving, and against investment in physical  capital in 
particular due to a substitution of human for physical capital. The wage tax on 
the other hand distorts the incentives to  invest in human  ~apital.~  Both the 
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volume and the mix of capital accumulations are affected by a revenue-neutral 
shift from capital income to labor income tax in ways that may significantly 
change the  welfare  implications  of  the tax reform.  It is not  a  priori  clear 
whether the welfare-improving reform should require such a tax shift at all. 
Second, it is commonplace  that investments in human  and physical  capital 
augment not only the individual investor’s earning capacity but also the econ- 
omy’s stock of knowledge. Incorporating this externality into the model tends 
to enlarge the gains from tax restructurings such as the ones considered in the 
paper. 